



SUFFOLK GENERIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN

Author:	Suffolk Constabulary & Joint Emergency Planning Unit on behalf of SRF
Date of Implementation:	14 November 2016
Review:	3 yearly
Version:	Issue 2.7

GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATIONS 2016/679 AND DATA PROTECTION ACT 2018

This plan does not include personal, sensitive or special category data as defined under the General Data Protection Regulations. It does include data/information relevant to achieve planning arrangements and identifies how more specific personal data will be used during any emergency.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000

This document will be made publicly available through the SRF website. Where content has been redacted under the freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOI) in the publicly available version, the paragraph number will be highlighted to show there has been a redaction and the relevant section of FOI referenced.

ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION REGULATIONS 2004 (IF REQUIRED)

This plan presumes disclosure of all environmental information, under Environment Information Regulations. Where exemptions are claimed under Environment Information Regulation 12 (5)a, this will only be where one of the responder agencies has judged that the information may adversely affect either international relations, defence, national security or public safety. Where such content has been identified, the paragraph number will be highlighted and the paragraph text removed from public versions of the plan.

REVIEW

This plan will be reviewed by the Suffolk Joint Emergency Planning Unit and Suffolk Constabulary on behalf of the Suffolk Resilience Forum at least every 3 years. Earlier reviews will take place if there is a change in working practices, legislation or lessons or best practice are identified during local incidents or exercises or nationally.

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DISTRIBUTION

MHCLG	- RED
BEIS	- Nuclear Emergency Planning
Environment Agency	
Animal and Plant Health Agency	
Maritime & Coastguard Agency	- NMOC
Public Health England	- CRCE
Highways England	
Met Office	
National Grid Gas	
National Grid Electricity	
BT	- Emergency Planning
Network Rail	- Security & Emergency Planning
Civil Nuclear Constabulary	- Contingency Planning
EDF	- Existing Nuclear Emergency Planning
Magnox Ltd	- Emergency Preparedness
NHS England and NHS Improvements	- East (East) Emergency Preparedness
Office for Nuclear Regulation	- Emergency Preparedness
USAFE (UK) - RAF Mildenhall	
HQ 7th Infantry Brigade & HQ East	- Joint Regional Liaison Officer East
HQ Air Command	- RAF Regional Liaison Officer East of England
Cadent	
Anglian Water	- Emergency Plans
Essex & Suffolk Water	- Emergency Plans
UKPN	- Emergency Planning Manager
Greater Anglia	- Emergency Planning, Security and Fire Coordinator
Public Health England	- East of England PH Team
East of England Ambulance	- Emergency Planning
Service NHS Trust	
Suffolk Constabulary	- Contingency Planning
Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service	- Resilience Team
Suffolk CCGs	- Emergency Planning
Suffolk Local Authorities	- via JEPu
ABP Ipswich	
ABP Lowestoft	
Hutchison Ports Felixstowe	
Harwich Haven Authority	
Norfolk LRF	
Essex LRF	
Cambridgeshire LRF	

AMENDMENT RECORD

Amendment	Date	Amended by	Summary
1.5	June 12	Andy Osman	Revised protective marking, changes to sub national crisis management structures and learning from Ex REBOUND.
1.6	Jul 13	KC / MG / ED	Amendment to all references to health services in line with new NHS structure, removed reference to the regional mortuary and updated the roles of responsibilities of all agencies in clause 4.
2	Oct 14	AO	Reissue to cover JESIP, Op FULSTONE and Ex EAGLE learning, changes to multi-agency command and control, adjustments to StratCC plans, change title to focus on response phase.
2.1	Jan 15	AO	Addition of Suffolk Emergency Helpline & move to national ACPO SITREP format
2.2	Aug 16	AO & CA	Insertion of CT and cross border arrangements. Updated UK military and SAR content. Removal of multi-agency Logistics Cell. Minor changes to SCG and TCG arrangements, to reflect organisational changes and to glossary. Change to major Incident definition.
2.3	Nov 16	KC	Add 'Officer' to the end of the last paragraph of 2.2 to read JEPU Emergency Planning Duty Officer. Correction to the text of the second paragraph of 5.3 to reflect the text agreed at WOW on 3 Aug 16.
2.4	Mar 17	KC	Add new bullet to 4.1c) - Provide access to local authority owned facilities to assist with support to the emergency services (e.g. catering, toilets or rest rooms (County and District Councils)
2.5	Aug 17	AO	Change to format of SCG meetings, management of spontaneous volunteers, inclusion of Volunteer Reception Centre, addition of reference to Recovery handover form, Community Help Point, CFOA to NCAF, LA R&Rs and change in SRF Chair
2.6	Oct 18	AO	Minor change to implement learning from Op LANGDALES (2018 severe weather) – pre-major incident coordination and initial SRF teleconference
2.7	Oct 19	AO/CA	Incorporate changes to align with SRF Generic Recovery Plan and new Suffolk local authorities' titles

Latest amendments are side lined

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background. This plan provides detail of how Suffolk will generically respond to major incidents or emergencies. This is the overarching plan for hazard and threats identified by the Suffolk Resilience Forum (SRF).

1.2. Aim. The aims of this plan are to:

- a. Provide a consolidated reference point for how Suffolk will respond to emergencies
- b. To act as a signpost for more detailed plans which explain response to specific hazards and threats.
- c. Outline the standing arrangements for warning and alerting.
- d. Detail the default arrangements for coordination at strategic, tactical and operational levels of response to major incidents and emergencies.
- e. Outline the multi-agency emergency response communications network and related information management requirements.
- f. Identify generic operational roles and responsibilities of Suffolk Category 1 and 2 responders plus key supporting agencies in a major incident or emergency.

1.3. SRF Emergency Plans. All SRF emergency plans are available on the Suffolk Resilience website (<http://www.suffolkresilience.com>), in redacted version if appropriate, or on Resilience Direct, full version.

1.4. Individual Agency Plans. Each responding agency maintains detailed plans on their own individual response and recovery activities that complement SRF plans. Further information on individual responder plans is available from each agency direct; links to agency websites can be found on the Suffolk Resilience website.

2. CONTEXT

2.1. Resilience Framework. [The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 \(CCA 2004\)](#) and associated guidance sets out the framework for national, regional and local resilience to promote emergency preparedness through regular cooperation and information sharing between responding agencies. The principal mechanism for routine cooperation in Suffolk is the SRF. This forum comprises representatives from each Category 1¹ responder in Suffolk with an open invitation to Category 2 responders. A separate [business plan](#) guides the routine work of the SRF.

2.2. Major Incidents. The definition² of a Major Incident is:

An event or situation, with a range of serious consequences, which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agencies.

This definition is amplified by the following notes:

- a. 'Emergency responder agencies' describes all Category one and two responders as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and associated guidance.
- b. A major incident is beyond the scope of business-as-usual operations, and is likely to involve serious harm, damage, disruption or risk to human life or welfare, essential services, the environment or national security.
- c. A major incident may involve a single-agency response, although it is more likely to require a multi-agency response, which may be in the form of multi-agency support to a lead responder.
- d. The severity of consequences associated with a major incident are likely to constrain or complicate the ability of responders to resource and manage the incident, although a major incident is unlikely to affect all responders equally.
- e. The decision to declare a major incident will always be a judgement made in a specific local and operational context, and there are no precise and universal thresholds or triggers.

Any Suffolk emergency responder that considers an incident meets the definition may declare a Major Incident and is responsible for notifying other responders of this declaration.

SRF Emergency Plans for certain risks include a pre-commitment for Major Incident declaration and associated notification arrangements. These are:

- **Sizewell Off Site Emergency Plan – Off Site nuclear emergency declaration**

¹ Suffolk Constabulary, Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service, Suffolk Local Authorities (Tier 1 and 2), NHS England, East of England Ambulance Service, Public Health England, Maritime & Coastguard Agency and Environment Agency.

² JESIP Doctrine – July 2016

- **COMAH External Emergency Plan – External COMAH emergency declaration.**
- **SRF Pipelines – Level 4 response**
- **Suffolk Marine Pollution Emergency Response Plan – Tier 3 response**
- **Severe Weather Response Plan– heatwave and cold – Level 4**
- **Suffolk Flood Plan – Severe Flood Warning**

Where there is doubt over the need for a Major Incident declaration, a coordination teleconference may be held. This can be initiated by any Suffolk emergency responder through the JEPU Emergency Planning Duty Officer.

2.3. Emergencies. The CCA 2004 defines an emergency as either:

- a. An event or situation that threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK, OR
- b. An event or situation that threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the UK, OR
- c. War or terrorism that threatens serious damage to the security of the UK.

The CCA 2004 allows for special provisions for emergency situations through the use of Emergency Powers.

2.4. Effective Response. Emergency response and recovery arrangements are founded on the premise that those organisations fulfilling functions on a day to day basis are best placed to exercise them in the demanding circumstances of an emergency. The following principles are used within Suffolk contingency planning to promote and deliver arrangements that are flexible and can be tailored to reflect specific circumstances:

- a. Continuity. Wherever possible Suffolk response arrangements will utilise existing structures and ways of doing things. This increases the ability of responders to meet the challenges of emergencies as they operate within familiar surroundings. The SRF is an example of this as the routine structure forms the basis of the Suffolk crisis management organisation during emergencies.
- b. Preparedness. Individuals and organisations that may be required to participate in response and/or recovery activity are prepared; i.e. they understand their roles and responsibilities and how they fit into the wider picture. The standardised layout of multi-agency contingency plans within Suffolk identifies clear roles and responsibilities and outlines operational concepts to be used to deliver an effective and coordinated response to incidents. These arrangements are amplified by single agency response plans and procedures to provide clear direction and actions for responders to follow.
- c. Subsidiarity. Suffolk response activity is based upon a bottom up approach from the incident scene. The response or recovery activity at the incident site forms the building block that the wider county crisis management activity supports. This approach is reinforced by a county focused multi-agency coordination structure to oversee a timely response.

d. Direction. When an emergency or major incident occurs, normal response procedures by the emergency services and supporting agencies can quickly become overwhelmed by scale and complexity. In these cases, a timely decision to declare a major incident and to adopt a crisis management structure to provide clear direction is required. The resultant emergency management structure develops a clear and unambiguous strategic aim for the response to be developed, shared priorities for effort and resources to be established and a coordinated and supported response to be delivered at the incident scene.

e. Integration. A key component of emergency response is to ensure that the crisis management organisation allows key agencies to combine as required to provide a single focus for activity and can consult, agree and decide on key issues. In Suffolk, the strategic, tactical and operational emergency management structure, detailed later, provides an integrated approach which all county, regional and national responding agencies operate within.

f. Cooperation. Emergency response is a multi-agency activity and the management of such brings together a wide range of organisations that are not bounded by hierarchical relationships. While one agency may take the lead in the crisis management organisation at strategic and tactical levels, the decision-making process will always be discursive and consensual.

g. Communication. Effective response is supported by an accurate, timely, two-way flow of information. However, there is a balance to strike between ensuring decisions are well informed and acting swiftly and decisively. The pattern of meetings at the higher levels of crisis management should adopt the process of spending 1/3 of the time to arrive at a decision and allowing 2/3 of the time to deliver the effect. Further, information management systems within coordination structures should be used to present a common situational picture to all levels to reinforce awareness and free up managers at lower levels to act within agreed strategies and direction.

h. Anticipation. Anticipation is often seen as the 1st phase of the integrated emergency management process covering 'horizon scanning'. This activity is routinely undertaken by individual responding agencies in Suffolk and combined in the Community Risk Register that provides a perspective of risks within the county. Anticipation is also important at all level of crisis management during both response and recovery phases to ensure that the initiative is maintained amidst the pressure and urgency of events.


3. CONTINGENCY PLANNING

3.1. Suffolk Resilience Forum (SRF). The SRF is the mechanism by which local responders routinely cooperate with each other to discharge their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA 2004). The SRF is not a statutory body nor does it have powers to direct its members; however, it is the agreed forum that coordinates multi-agency emergency preparedness, including risk assessment, contingency planning, training and exercise. The SRF seeks to enhance Suffolk preparedness for emergencies through the principles of integrated emergency management by:

- a. Pre-planning for Very High and High risks identified in the Suffolk Community Risk Register. This is in addition to statutory contingency planning for certain installations.
- b. Embedding emergency preparedness activity within each responding agencies' business arrangements.
- c. Maintaining appropriately trained and equipped people to respond to incidents and to subsequently recover an incident scene.
- d. Exercising together at regular intervals to validate arrangements and ensure key people meet each other prior to emergencies.
- e. Maintaining flexible arrangements to ensure response and recovery can always be provided and adapted to suit unplanned situations.


Further information on the working of the SRF can be found in the [SRF Business Plan](#).

3.2. Suffolk Resilience Organisation. The executive of Suffolk Resilience organisation is as follows:



3.3. **Risk Assessment.** The SRF maintains a [Community Risk Register](#) containing assessments for all potential natural and man-made risks to Suffolk. All Suffolk local responders are involved in the review of this document and contingency planning arrangements are developed to mitigate the impact and consequences of those hazards and threats identified as VERY HIGH and HIGH.

3.4. **Multi-Agency Plans.** The SRF maintains emergency plans for key risks within the county and these documents represent the agreed basis for multi-agency response. These plans sit beneath the Generic Emergency Response Plan and the Generic Recovery Plan and provide more focused emergency arrangements relating to specific hazards. In addition to plans for key risks, hazard specific response plans are also maintained by the SRF to meet statutory requirements under Radiation (Emergency Preparedness & Public Information) Regulations, Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations and Major Accident Pipeline Regulations. Published plans can be found on the SRF website. This planning structure is shown below:



3.5. Business Continuity. Business continuity management (BCM) is an internal organisational process that helps manage risks to the smooth running of an organisation or delivery of a service, ensuring continuity of critical functions in the event of a disruption, and effective recovery from any incident. All Category 1 responders have a duty to maintain such arrangements. As risks driving business continuity are often the same as those which drive emergency planning, it is important that close links are maintained between business continuity and emergency preparedness arrangements. These links should be maintained within each agency by relevant staff and may also be generated within the SRF process to ensure no duplication of effort or resources between the 2 areas.

4. RESPONSE ORGANISATION - ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

4.1 Responding Agencies. Suffolk response to emergencies or major incidents will normally start with agencies based in the county, but may also involve regional or nationally based agencies or mutual aid depending upon the scale and nature of the incident. The generic roles of the core responding agencies are given below. Any roles and responsibilities that are specific to a hazard will be included within the relevant SRF and single agency plan.

Generic roles and responsibilities for all agencies:

- Support identification of vulnerable persons.
- Support generation of situational awareness.
- Support Suffolk multi-agency coordination.
- Support multi-agency media coordination.
- Provide consistent public information before, during and after an incident.

Single agency generic roles and responsibilities

a. Suffolk Constabulary.

- Saving and protection of life is the priority, but as far as possible, preservation of the scene to safeguard evidence for subsequent enquiries or criminal proceedings.
- In most circumstances coordinate the activities of those responding at and around the scene of a land-based 'rapid onset' emergency.
- In conjunction with other emergency services, control access to the incident location through maintenance of cordons at appropriate distances.
- Coordinate land-based search activities for survivors and casualties in the immediate vicinity of a disaster scene, where necessary using support from other emergency services, the Armed Forces, or volunteers.
- Process casualty information and take responsibility for identifying and arranging the removal of fatalities (on behalf of HM Coroner).
- Oversee criminal investigations and facilitate enquiries carried out by responsible accident bodies (Health & Safety Executive, Air, Rail or Marine Accident Investigation Branches).
- Once lifesaving complete, incident scene will be preserved as a crime scene until confirmed otherwise (unless emergency has no element of human culpability e.g. severe weather or other natural phenomena).
- Assume overall control of terrorist related incidents at the scene, including additional measures to restrict access or to evacuate people.
- Family Liaison.
- Prevention of crime.
- Facilitate access to national resources, e.g. DVI, Casualty Bureau, etc

b. Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service.

- Rescue trapped persons, save life and protect property.
- Prevent further escalation of an incident by controlling or extinguishing fires.
- Manage issues associated with released hazardous materials and/or contaminants to remove/reduce public and emergency responder safety issues including establishing inner/outer cordons and implementation of appropriate measures to mitigate against environmental damage.
- Assist agencies with salvage activities provided for life safety (including the removal of large quantities of water) where the capability exists with due regard for existing policy.
- Assist Ambulance services with casualty handling where joint Dynamic Risk Assessment identifies the need.
- Assist the Police with the recovery of bodies in accordance with agreed MOU or joint Dynamic Risk Assessment.
- Maintain and manage Inner Cordon gateways (with exception of confirmed terrorist incidents).
- In consultation with Ambulance service, undertake mass decontamination of general public post CBRN incident.
- Facilitate access to specialist National resources; e.g. Tactical Advisors, High Volume Pumping, Urban Search and Rescue, Underwater Search and Recovery and Fire Special Operations Teams.

c. Suffolk Local Authorities (Suffolk County Council, Babergh District Council, Forest Heath District Council, Ipswich Borough Council, Mid Suffolk District Council, St Edmundsbury Borough Council, Suffolk Coastal District Council and Waveney District Council).

- Provide emergency / post incident highways management & passenger transport support, to the emergency services on the SCC road network (County Council).
- Provide Rest Centres for displaced people (District Councils).
- Liaise with HM Coroner to confirm Emergency Mortuary & staff support requirement (County Council).
- Provide access to local authority owned facilities to assist with support to the emergency services (e.g. catering, toilets or rest rooms) (County and District Councils)
- Collect waste (District Council).
- Manage disposal of waste (County Council)
- Provide a link with non-emergency agencies and bodies (Local Enterprise Partnerships, building proprietors and landowners) (County and District Councils).
- Provide a focus for the coordination of voluntary organisations support (County Council)

- Provide a range of immediate and longer term welfare support to those affected, through Emergency Reception Centres (County and District Councils).
 - Provide long term support for communities (anniversaries and memorials) (County and District Councils).
- d. Suffolk Director of Public Health.
- In conjunction with PHE, provide public protection advice and information.
 - Support the public health Incident Management / Outbreak Control Team (IMT / OCT).
- e. Suffolk Coroner.
- Establishing the identity of fatalities.
 - Determine the cause and circumstances of death.
- f. Port Health Authorities (Suffolk Coastal Port Health Authority).

Responsible for infectious disease control, environmental protection, imported food control and hygiene on vessels.

4.2 Sub National Agencies. The following sub national structures provide support to the Suffolk response as follows:

- a. East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust.
- The medical assessment of the emergency.
 - Coordinate the on-site NHS response including provision for MERIT and Medical Advisors (MAs).
 - Identify and activate the resources needed to respond.
 - Provision of specialist resources i.e. SORT, HART, tactical advice.
 - Manage the NHS activities at the scene.
 - Coordinate and manage the NHS communications on scene.
 - Triage, decontaminate, stabilise and administer initial treatment and assist with extrication.
 - Transport casualties to hospital.
 - Protect the health and safety of all NHS personnel on site.

The Ambulance Service has specific responsibilities to the NHS and other agencies when responding to civil emergencies:

- Immediately notify police and fire control centres of the exact location and nature of the emergency incident, including identification of specific hazards, e.g. chemical, biological, radiation or other known hazards.
- Alert the appropriate receiving hospital(s) based on the circumstances and information received.

- Alert neighbouring ambulance services based on the circumstances and information received.
- Alert affected NHS Trusts and Public Health England based on the circumstances and information received.
- Offer effective support to neighbouring/associated agencies that are substantially affected by a major incident and in return rely on such mutual support as is needed/requested.

4.3 National Agencies. The following national organisations provide support to Suffolk response activity, normally through regionally based offices:

a. NHS England.

- Lead and coordinate the NHS response in conjunction with the local Clinical Commissioning Groups, including mobilisation of NHS resources.
- Ensure continuity of local health care services to those affected and unaffected.
- Provide a communications and reporting link to the Department of Health and Social Care.
- Ensure NHS representation at SCG and TCG.
- Coordinate health support to Local Authority Humanitarian Assistance in conjunction with the Clinical Commissioning Groups.
- Coordinate health response across a wide geographical area.

b. Public Health England.

- Provide leadership for public health incidents in Suffolk.
- Provide risk analysis and assessment of emerging diseases, natural extreme events, chemical, radiological and Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) threats.
- Provide advice and information to protect the public.
- In conjunction with response partners confirm the resources needed to provide relevant public protection measures.
- Represent PHE at SCG/STAC and TCG if appropriate.
- Provide health protection services, expertise and advice and co-ordinate the PHE response to major incidents in relation to outbreaks of disease and CBRN.
- Ensure provision of high quality and timely public health data.
- Provide guidance to professionals in health and local government and other sectors.

c. Environment Agency.

- Prevent or minimise the environmental impact of the incident.
- Investigate the cause of the incident and consider enforcement action.
- Seek remediation, clean up or restoration of the environment.

- For Flooding: Issue flood warnings and operate their flood defence assets to protect communities at risk.
 - For Pollution: Seek to prevent/control and monitor the input of pollutants to the environment.
 - Other Emergencies: Regulate and provide advice and support on waste disposal and environmental issues.
 - Represent EA at SCG/STAC and TCG as appropriate.
 - Provide a communications and reporting link to DEFRA.
- d. Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA).
- Prevent, control and where feasible eradicate notifiable diseases.
 - Prevent notifiable animal diseases from entering the human food chain and endangering public health, the economy and rural community.
 - Ensure the safe disposal of products of animal origin intended for human consumption.
- e. Health & Safety Executive.
- Regulate safety, factories, farms, hospitals, schools, offshore gas and oil installations and onshore major hazard sites.
 - Regulate safety of gas grid, power generation and distribution networks and domestic gas safety.
 - Regulate workplace health & safety for emergency services and other responding agencies.
 - Provide CBRN specialist or technical advice to support response and recovery planning.
- f. Highways England.
- Assist Police with general management and clearance of traffic incidents (A11/A14/A12), including diversions.
 - Provide coordinated traffic information to support the public awareness of traffic incidents.
 - Liaison with Suffolk Highways authority.
- g. Maritime & Coastguard Agency.
- Initiate and coordinate civil maritime search and rescue (includes mobilising, organising and dispatching resources to assist people in distress at sea, in danger on cliffs, shoreline, or in certain inland areas).
 - Dealing with pollution at sea and assist local authorities with shoreline clean up.
 - Support emergency service and local authorities during emergencies, e.g. flooding.

h. Food Standards Agency.

- Take action to ensure that contaminated food does not enter the food chain, implementing, as necessary, CFIL restriction orders under the EU's 'Council Food Intervention Levels' regulations.
- Provide advice and information to the public regarding restrictions placed on the consumption of foodstuffs and other reassurance messages.
- Ensure, in conjunction with the Environment Agency, the safe management of contaminated foodstuffs.

i. Office for Nuclear Regulation.

- Protecting persons against risks of harm arising from ionising radiations from UK nuclear sites.
- Protecting people from risks to health and safety from work activities on UK sites.
- Ensuring the security of civil nuclear premises.
- Protecting against risks relating to the civil transport of radioactive material in UK by road, rail or inland waterways.

j. Resilience & Emergencies Division, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG).

- Establish whether Strategic Co-ordinating Groups have been set up, or are on standby, then maintaining immediate lines of communication with them, including identifying whether there are likely to be issues arising or capability gaps emerging which may require central government support or input.
- Participate/dial in to coordinating group meetings (SCGs) and act as a single point of contact through which communications to and from central government flow.
- Work closely with the Regional Desk Manager to keep them informed of issues being raised in the SCGs and escalate issues that may require a Response Coordination Group Meeting (ResCG).
- In the event of a potential emergency or escalating incident or at the request of local responders or the Lead Government Department in consultation with the Cabinet Office, convene a ResCG.
- Report back to central government on activities and questions from the SCG. This enables strategic decision makers at Government level to have a sufficient understanding of the local consequences so they can make informed decisions on any nationally coordinated response measures.
- Represent central government at the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC), identifying decisions which may be challenged by government ministers, and informing the SCG Chair of potential questions ministers may ask. (GLOs may also support the SCG Chair for dialling into a Whitehall meeting to update ministers or officials directly.)

- Ensure a multi-agency SITREP is developed and maintained for each SCG; established in order to support local response efforts and to contribute to the national appreciation of the situation.
- Establish and maintain immediate lines of communication with the Lead Government Department and the Cabinet Office. As part of this process, agreeing the level and frequency of ongoing reporting requirements including providing the local multi-SCG SITREP (to be agreed on a case by case basis with the Lead Government Department and the Cabinet Office in situations where COBR is activated) to feed into the national picture coordinated by COBR or the Lead Government Department as appropriate.
- Activate an Operations Centre(s) (OpC), if required, in order to provide a focal point for the collection and collation of information on the situation, a point of contact for local responders, and to engage as necessary other bodies to provide the local or multi-SCG picture to local responders and government as necessary.
- Work with partners to identify priorities and providing advice to COBR and Lead Government Departments to support national discussions on the deployment of scarce resources across the affected area.
- Facilitate mutual aid arrangements between LRFs.
- Assist local responders deliver a coordinated and coherent public message through sharing Government's lines to take.
- Be ready on request to provide information to local MPs in affected constituencies.
- Whilst the SCG is still standing, provide incident situation reports and advice to brief the Lead Government Department organising Ministerial or VIP visits in consultation with local partners.
- Enable the transition from response to recovery by ensuring an effective handover from MHCLG RED GLOs to Lead Government Department officials taking up responsibility for supporting local responders and any Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG).

k. UK Armed Forces.

The UK Armed Forces' national structure, organisation, skills, equipment and training can be of benefit to civil authorities in supporting planning for and management of the response to and recovery from emergencies. The Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) arrangement governs this support. Subject to availability, military judgement and Defence Ministerial authority, the contribution of Defence can now be viewed as reinforcing national resilience through effectively providing military capacity, capability and resources, to assist in the planning, response and recovery for a wide range of disruptive events. Suffolk contingency plans do not rely upon the UK Armed Forces to support response or recovery activity, but would consider early in the response to every significant incident whether there is, or may later be, a role for the armed forces, and would have access to military advisors for information on the capabilities that may be available to support the response. Requests for support are routed through the Joint Regional Liaison Officer East at HQ 7th Infantry Brigade & HQ East. See Chapter 10 (Mutual Aid) for additional detail.

I. US Armed Forces.

The US Visiting Forces (USVF) based in Suffolk, primarily at RAF Mildenhall and RAF Lakenheath, are also configured with organisation, skills, equipment and training that could be of benefit to civil authorities in managing the response to and recovery from emergencies. US Department of Defense direction on provision of Foreign Disaster Relief by USVF governs this potential support. Requests for support are routed through USAF representatives (USAF/UK Chief, International Relations) or, in their absence, the RAFRLO-EE or through the JRLO East at HQ 7th Infantry Brigade and HQ East. Specific off-site Major Incident arrangements have been developed for RAF Mildenhall and RAF Lakenheath to guide UK/US emergency response activity (available on SRF Resilience Direct site). Contact details for RAF Mildenhall Command Post are included within the SRF Alerting Directory to allow links with USAFE-UK Deputy Director or USAFE-UK Chief International Relations to be established during any warning period. See Chapter 10 (Mutual Aid) for additional detail.

m. Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation (DNEO).

The MOD DNEO works in conjunction with the SRF, to provide an effective response to an accident or incident, including those arising as the result of terrorist acts, involving defence nuclear assets. Specific guidance to responders is provided in the [Local Authority and Emergency Services Information](#) (LAESI) document.

n. Utilities.

Cadent (Gas), UK Power Networks (Electricity), Anglian Water/ Essex & Suffolk Water (Water) and British Telecom (lead telecommunications) provide key utility services within Suffolk and will during emergencies:

- Work to reinstate mains supply
- Assist in the identification of vulnerable people
- Provide temporary measures until mains supply can be reinstated.

There are established sector-specific arrangements for emergency response and companies will work closely with emergency services and local authorities during the response and recovery phase, including linking in with Suffolk crisis management structures.

o. Harbour (Ports) Authorities.

The Harbour (Ports) Authorities in Suffolk, Associated British Ports (ABP) Ipswich, ABP Lowestoft and Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company, are responsible for planning for emergencies that might affect operations in the port or harbour area. These authorities will contribute to SRF response arrangements, for example, provision of vessels, specialist knowledge or accommodation (victim holding areas).

5. WARNING, ALERTING & SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

5.1. Warning. The system of providing warnings to responders is a key process that supports the anticipation principle of integrated emergency management and allows escalation of preparedness when there is an increased risk of a particular hazard occurring. In several instances, hazard specific contingency plans use warning systems to trigger preparedness and response activity e.g. SRF Flood Plan. Warning systems in use fall into 2 categories, formal and informal:

a. Formal. The following formal warning systems should be used by each Suffolk responder:

- (1) Environment Agency - Flood Warning Service and Flood Advisory Service.
- (2) Flood Forecasting Centre – Flood Guidance Statement
- (3) Met Office National Severe Weather Warning.
- (4) Met Office Heat Health Watch.
- (5) Met Office Cold Watch.
- (6) Maritime and Coastguard Agency - Pollution Report

b. Informal. Routine incidents in Suffolk attended to by the emergency services often have the potential to escalate into an emergency or major incident situation. The respective emergency services control rooms have agreed to routinely share incident information with SRF partners (via the JEPUs) when a certain level of routine response is reached to provide warning of potential escalation to a major incident situation. This allows agencies that maybe required to respond to be aware of the situation and to initiate emergency preparedness arrangements.

5.2. Alerting. In the event of a ‘rapid onset’ incident (e.g. aircraft crash) or escalation of a routine emergency services response (e.g. road traffic collision) as mentioned above, it is important that relevant agencies can act quickly in terms of response, crisis, public information and media management. To facilitate rapid notification of agencies a 24/7 a SRF ALERTING DIRECTORY is maintained which can be triggered by the relevant agency dependent on the incident. This directory lists all local, regional, sub-national and some national contacts for agencies that may be required to support response or recovery activity. This is distributed to all Suffolk Category 1 and 2 responders via the SRF RD site. This document is not publicly available due to the sensitivity of some contact numbers.

5.3. Notification.

It is the responsibility of the originating emergency responder to notify other Suffolk emergency responders of an ‘incident’³ using the SRF Alerting Directory.

Any appropriately empowered⁴ Suffolk emergency responder⁵ can request the convening of an SCG teleconference through the JEPUs Emergency Planning

³ An incident is something that is beyond usual activity and which poses an increased risk but does not meet the definition of a Major Incident – para 2.2.

⁴ Chief Officer or empowered Duty Officer

⁵ Defined as Category 1 or 2 responders

Duty Officer to review the risk associated with an incident and any Major Incident declaration that might be needed.

5.4. Public Information. Public information on natural and manmade risks within Suffolk, contingency arrangements and advice to communities and businesses on what to do prior to and during any incident is published on the Suffolk Resilience website: www.suffolkresilience.com.

In addition, a self-help emergency guidelines card has been produced and distributed at public events and certain public buildings. Further copies of this information card are available from the Suffolk JEPUs.

During the warning phase of any potential emergency or an actual emergency, local media and press will be used to provide local information, advice and contact details as part of a coordinated communications approach managed by the Media Coordination Cell at the StratCC.

Further information on providing information to the public during emergencies can be found in the [SRF Communications Plan](#).


5.5. Suffolk Emergency Helpline (SEH). The Suffolk Emergency Helpline 0345 603 2814 is a public facing helpline capability provided by Suffolk County Council (SCC). The SEH can be activated by the SCG or requested by a single agency. Activation is managed by Suffolk County Council and JEPUs. The aim of the SEH is to provide public information and advice during an emergency. In order to do this, staff need accurate and updated information to answer public enquires and responder agencies may be asked to support the SEH at Endeavour House if existing media communications links are unable to provide this. The capability would be activated to relieve pressure on emergency service control rooms. Use of this capability will attract a cost to requesting agencies and an operating protocol is included within the SRF Communications Plan.

5.6 Situational Awareness. Responders in Suffolk use the METHANE model to establish shared situational awareness during the initial stages of any incident.

M	Major Incident declared?
E	Exact Location
T	Type of incident
H	Hazards present or suspected
A	Access - routes that are safe to use
N	Number, type, severity of casualties
E	Emergency services present and those required

6. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION


6.1 Suffolk Multi-Agency Response Framework. Suffolk uses the statutory generic framework for managing emergency response and recovery as updated by JESIP (See [Appendix F](#) for further information). This framework assists the integration of plans and procedures within and across geographical boundaries. It ensures that all agencies understand their roles and responsibilities within combined response and is based upon various levels of crisis management as follows:



Multi-agency/major incidents generally fall into 2 categories:

- **Rising Tide.** Incidents with some warning, such as severe weather or flooding, allowing time to prepare. In these instances a formal multi-agency emergency management structure can be implemented ahead of the incident occurring and will follow the standard structure shown above.
- **Rapid Onset.** An incident that happens without any warning, such as an industrial accident or serious road traffic collision, where management of the response will usually start at the operational level by the emergency services and be escalated through the tactical and strategic command levels as required dependent on the development of the emergency/incident.

The transition from routine, single agency incident management to multi-agency major incident management is shown graphically as follows:



The Suffolk multi-agency command, control and coordination diagram is at [Appendix A](#) and location of agency control rooms is at [Appendix B](#).

6.2. Strategic Level.

- a. Location. SCG's should be virtual whenever possible to reduce resources demand, however this is at the discretion of the SRF Executive/SCG Chair. If a physical SCG is activated, the location is Strategic Coordination Centre (StratCC), Suffolk Constabulary HQ, Martlesham Heath, Ipswich.
- b. Core Functions. Located in the StratCC are the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG), Media Coordination Cell (MCC), Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) and Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG).
- c. StratCC Resources and Procedures. Staff requirements and agreed operating procedures to support working at the StratCC are contained within the Strategic Coordination Centre Guidance.
- d. Activation. The StratCC will be activated by Suffolk Constabulary on declaration of a Major Incident. The StratCC may also be used prior to a Major Incident during a 'Rising Tide' event on the direction of the SRF Executive.

e. Strategic Coordinating Group.

- Roles. The role of the SCG is to:
 - Take overall responsibility for the multi-agency management of the emergency.
 - Establish the policy and strategic framework (utilising the Joint Decision Making model at **Appendix F**) within which lower tier command and coordinating groups will work.
 - Anticipate and consider long term impacts that may arise.
 - Cascade response strategy to TCG.
- SCG Meetings and SCG Chair. SCG meetings, either virtual or physical, occur when there is the likelihood of a full major incident response, or a major incident has been declared, and are chaired as follows:
 - Pre-Major Incident. In recognition of the uncertainty in the early stages of 'rising tide' incidents over the scale and impact of the event, Suffolk has adopted a scaled down version of multi-agency management called 'Coord Lite'. This interim position, on the path from normal emergency response by 'blue lights' agencies to a full multi-agency major incident management structure, allows for a flexible strategic management structure to be adopted while clarity on the incident situation is determined. This will always involve an initial SCG teleconference at Exec level to determine ongoing coordination arrangements where a Major Incident is not declared. Where low level multi-agency response is agreed, a tactical coordination function (either at the TCG location, by teleconference or at another agreed venue) is likely and SCG teleconferences are likely to continue to provide higher level coordination and information sharing. The default Usually the Chair of the Initial SCG teleconference in a 'Coord Lite' phase would be the Chair or Vice Chair of the SRF. If the hazard suggests that a particular agency is best placed to chair this initial SCG meeting, then this agency may be asked to take the lead.
 - Major Incident. Once a full multi-agency major incident is declared, a SCG will be established by Suffolk Constabulary at the StratCC and the chair of the SCG will be provided by a Suffolk Constabulary Chief Officer unless another agency is pre-arranged in an SRF contingency plan.
 - Initial SCG Situational Awareness Briefing. As most current information is being received by the Emergency Services Control Rooms, the initial SCG briefing should be given by the relevant emergency services.

- Supporting Functions. If there is a requirement for a physical STAC, a physical SCG may also be required. Media Coordination is required in all instances where a multi-agency response is being undertaken; this can be either in a 'virtual' capacity or co-located with the SCG.
- SCG Composition. For major incidents, the core SCG will comprise of executive representatives from:
 - Suffolk Constabulary
 - Suffolk Fire & Rescue
 - East of England Ambulance Service
 - NHS England
 - Public Health England
 - Suffolk County Council
 - Suffolk District or Borough Council (relative to where the incident occurs or impact is felt)
 - Environment Agency
 - Met Office (weather related incidents)
 - MHCLG Resilience & Emergencies Division
 - Chair of STAC (if appropriate)
 - Chair Designate of Recovery Coordinating Group
 - UK Military
 - Sizewell operators (if nuclear emergency)
 - Office for Nuclear Regulation (if nuclear emergency).

In addition, liaison officers from the Maritime & Coastguard Agency or Category 2 responders may be required; these will be listed in SRF hazard or site specific plans available on the Suffolk Resilience website.

- Multi-Agency Support Staff. Staff from Suffolk Category 1 agencies provide support to the StratCC as follows:
 - Dedicated information collection and distribution.
 - Administrative support at StratCC.
 - Briefing to agencies arriving after set up (including which Emergency Plans are in operation).
- SCG Decision Making. The SCG does not have collective authority to issue executive orders. Each organisation retains its own responsibilities and exercises control of its own operations. The SCG, therefore, under the stewardship of the Chair relies upon a process of discussion and consensus to reach collective decisions. Further detail on SCG meeting, including default strategy and agenda is at [Appendix C.](#)

f. Recovery Coordinating Group and Chair. The formation of the RCG at the StratCC will be triggered automatically at the first meeting of the SCG unless a specific decision is taken not to do so due to the nature of the incident. This concurrent strategic function will be chaired by the Chief Executive or nominated

executive representative of the local authority area in which the incident has occurred (if more than 2 district areas involved, this will be the Chief Executive of Suffolk County Council). Once the response phase to any major incident ends, the SCG will consider formally moving to the recovery phase, a checklist showing the criteria for when the handover can take place from response to recovery and a formal handover certificate can be found at Annex A of the [SRF Generic Recovery Plan](#). Multi-agency coordination will then pass to the Local Authority. Further information on recovery is in the [SRF Generic Recovery Plan](#).

g. Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC). Science and technical advice during any incident will be provided in a coordinated manner to the SCG through the establishment of a Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC). This process will bring together scientific and technical expertise from a range of agencies and allow the establishment of an agreed advisory input to the SCG process. The manner in which STAC will be established may vary:

- Suffolk Only Incident. A STAC may be physically situated at the StratCC using resources drawn from local, regional, or national bodies.
- Regional or National Incident. The availability of scientific and technical staff will become stretched in any wide area incident and thus advice may be provided through a regionally situated STAC with local STAC members maintaining contact via a teleconference or video-link. A national Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) may also be established to provide advice and guidance to central government on longer term consequences.
- Nuclear Emergency Advice. Arrangements exist for the provision of scientific and technical advice during a nuclear emergency at Sizewell power stations. The Office for Nuclear Regulation and Sizewell operators would work with the STAC to provide advice to the SCG.

Further details on the arrangements STAC are contained in the Suffolk Strategic Coordination Centre Guide.

h. Media Coordination Cell. A major incident is likely to attract widespread local, national and even international media attention. A cell comprising of agency communications representatives will be established at the StratCC. This facility would also oversee the production and release of common information to the public via electronic and written media. As part of the media response, a number of briefing centres with accommodation for media conferences have been identified. Specialist communications staff from all responder agencies would assist in overseeing this function. Further information is available in the [SRF Communications Plan](#).

6.3. Tactical Level.

a. Location. Landmark House, Ipswich.

b. Core Functions. Tactical Commanders/Liaison Officers from each responding agency work within the TCG, including the Voluntary and Community Sector Coordinator if required.

c. Resources and Procedures. Information on staff requirements from each agency to support multi-agency working at the tactical level and agreed operating procedures are contained within the Suffolk Tactical Coordination Centre Guide.

d. Activation. The TCG may be triggered as follows:

- Rising Tide - on the direction of the SRF Executive.
- Sudden Impact – on declaration of a major incident or whenever a physical SCG is established.

Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service lead the setup of the TCG.

e. Tactical Coordinating Group.

- Roles.
 - Develop and implement a multi-agency Tactical Response Plan (utilising the Joint Decision Making model at **Appendix F**) to deliver the SCG strategy.
 - Ensure that operational commanders at the incident scene have the means to deliver the coordinated response by acting as a conduit for resources and consideration of issues that may arise, e.g. vulnerable people and related specialist resource requirements, impact of tactical activity on future recovery.
 - Collate information on the implications of the emergency and upload relevant information via RD to help the development of the multi-Escalate collective resource issues that require SCG decision making.
 - Cascade requirements to individual agency Operational Commanders/Emergency Control Centres.
 - agency SITREP.
 - Escalate information/intelligence received from Commanders/Emergency Control Centres that may impact on strategic response or recovery planning.
- TCG Meetings and TCG Chair.
 - Pre-Major Incident. During a 'rising tide' incident or significant public event that requires multi-agency coordination for safety purposes, a TCG may be established to provide a focal point for collective working. In this instance, the Chair of the TCG will be agreed between responder agencies.
 - Major Incident. Once a major incident is declared and a TCG will be established by Suffolk Fire and Rescue Service staff at Landmark House and the Chair of the TCG will be provided by Suffolk Constabulary unless another agency is pre-arranged in an SRF contingency plan.

- TCG Composition. For major incidents, the core TCG will comprise of appropriate representatives from:
 - Suffolk Constabulary.
 - Suffolk Fire & Rescue.
 - East of England Ambulance Service.
 - NHS (CCG).
 - Public Health England.
 - Local Authority (relative to where the incident occurs or impact is felt).
 - Environment Agency (maybe via teleconference).
 - MCA (if appropriate)
 - Voluntary and Community Sector Coordination if required.
 - Utilities (if appropriate).
 - UK Military (if appropriate).
- Multi-Agency Support Staff. Staff from Suffolk Category 1 agencies provide support to the TCG as follows:
 - Dedicated information collection and distribution.
 - Administrative support to TCG.

f. Voluntary and community Sector Coordination. Suffolk County Council (Localities and Partnerships) will act as a focal point for voluntary organisations support to an emergency response, including linking with the existing Community Action Suffolk framework. This complements specific voluntary organisation arrangements agreed through SVOG. This coordination maybe collocated at the TCG or provided remotely through the Suffolk CC ECC.

6.4. Operational Level.

- a. Location. Forward Control Points (FCP) will be established close to an incident scene, or at specific point for a wide area incident to provide a focal point for the face to face management of the operational emergency response.
- b. Roles. Further information on staffing the FCP is contained in individual agency operational plans that are based upon 'JESIP - Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework'. FCP roles as follows:

- Delivery of single agency tasks to fulfil the requirements of agreed tactical plans (cordons, traffic management, running rest centres etc).
- Provision of information/intelligence/issues to single agency Tactical Commanders/Emergency Control Centres that may impact on the implementation of the current plan/ongoing planning processes including any resourcing issues.
- Ensuring relevant multi-agency activity is carried out at operational level and that JESIP principles are being applied.
- Supervise welfare of deployed staff.
- Reporting to single agency SILVER Command/Emergency Control Centre on completion of tasks.

6.5. Individual Agency Emergency Control Rooms. During a Major Incident, each responding agency will usually coordinate response activity, agreed collectively at SCG, through individual agency Emergency Control Rooms or Incident Rooms. These are shown on the map at [Appendix B](#) and are responsible for delivering and sustaining individual agency support.

These controls rooms will initiate and control immediate response actions for any incident and will escalate information to allow the generation of more formal multi-agency emergency management structure covered previously for emergencies.

During any emergency, each responder agency remains responsible for:

- Assessing the requirements of their agency to fulfil the tactical plan.
- Provision of human resources.
- Provision of transport, accommodation, welfare requirements for the public.
- Provision of transport, welfare and personal protection equipment to staff.
- Briefing and deployment of agency assets to relevant locations (including any information on points of contact/liaison with partner agencies).
- Ensure actions are being completed and when.
- Seek information/intelligence that is required to assist in the ongoing response/recovery planning e.g. Any further resources required, changes to the situation etc.
- Maintain a welfare overview.
- Provide a link to TCG to update on progress of actions and provide information/intelligence received from operational staff that may impact on the tactical or strategic planning.

6.6. National Crisis Management Structures. In some instances, the nature or severity of an incident may necessitate the involvement of central government tier of emergency management. The likely form of central government involvement in emergencies is shown in the diagram at [Appendix E](#).

6.7. Cross Border Incidents. There are a number of risks that may have impacts or consequences across multiple counties including Suffolk, for example:

- A marine incident off shore resulting in casualties being brought ashore in either Essex or Norfolk or possible pollution on joining coastlines.
- Aviation incidents
- Rail incidents
- Severe traffic collisions
- Hazmat plumes or contaminants
- Impacts on utility infrastructure
- Flooding
- Infectious outbreaks

Where it is preferable that the Suffolk SCG seeks to align its response strategy with neighbouring SCGs, there may be an agreement for a specific SCG to take the lead in development a strategy that can be adopted by all. Dependent on the situation

and the urgency of such a decision, the following options (or combination of) should be utilized to agree such a cross SCG alignment:

- A discussion between the relevant Police Chief Officers
- A discussion between Coroners
- The SCG's of the impacted counties will undertake a 'fast time' analysis of the factors below from their locations perspective and form a consensus
- Consultation may be required with other parties as indicated under the relevant sections below.

The areas that need to be considered in making this decision (the JDM may assist this process) are:

- **In which County did the incident occur?** This may not always be evident, however there are factors that can be considered to provide a basis, for example:
 - Shipping incident - the departure or intended destination port
 - Aviation incident - the location of the main wreckage
 - Where the majority of casualties/fatalities are sited
 - Which location has suffered more impact
 - The registered address of any operator/polluter if it is located in either of the affected areas
- **Initial attendance.** In the instance that the prevalence of initial resources deployed are from one LRF it may be beneficial to allow them to retain the primacy.
- **Any investigative jurisdiction.** There may be a number of investigative aspects to any major incident as follows:
 - DVI
 - Incident specific (AAIB, RAIB, MAIB, HSE etc.)
 - Corporate manslaughter

If relevant, incident specific investigators may need to be consulted

- **Any Coroner's jurisdiction.** This may be based on the decision around which county did the incident occur or alternatively could be dependent on immediacy of accessibility to mortuary provision before escalation to any additional arrangements. If relevant, the Coroners will need to be involved in decision making.
- **Existing memoranda of understanding** or protocols between emergency services and agencies. Such as:
 - Access to specialist resources e.g. marine unit
 - Easiest access to the scene e.g. inbound or outbound carriageway for a major road traffic collision
 - Pre-determined attendance in bordering areas e.g. Newmarket Race Course, SFRS response to Firmin Coates, COMAH site in Cambridgeshire.

- LGD/COBR/MHCLG RED considerations

The indicators/options above are not exhaustive and other methods may be more suitable at the time of any plan activation. Any incidents of this nature will require timely and accurate communications and information sharing processes, this will be facilitated as follows:

- Standard information sharing protocols between emergency services control rooms, in the initial stages
- Deployment of liaison officers to the neighbouring SCG & TCG
- Use of Resilience Direct
- Use of national airwave JESIP/interoperability protocols

In the event that there is a change in which SCG leads the development of the response strategy, a formal handover will take place and this will be documented in the policy log.

6.8. Reporting. It is highly likely that during a major incident, information will be required at national level to allow wider communications, planning and support activities to be undertaken. Reporting can take two forms: single agency (e.g. Police reporting through NPCC) or multi-agency (e.g. SCG reporting to COBR via MHCLG RED team). A standard SITREP template for use by SCG is at [Appendix D](#).

6.9. Counter Terrorism Arrangements. The framework for responding to, and recovering from, a terrorist incident within Suffolk will be the same as that used for non-malicious incidents and will follow the arrangements set out earlier in this section. The Police has the role of coordinating the response to a terrorist incident; refer to the 'The 2015 Command, Control and Coordination of Major CT Operations' for Police protocols. Generally, the Police CT network will lead the operational response whilst the local Chief Constable (GOLD) of the affected force area will be responsible for consequence management and overseeing the coordination of other responders. The Police are likely to be supported by national Police assets and depending on the nature of the incident, possibly the UK armed forces in the delivery of any operational response. The impact of terrorist incidents on public confidence, and the possibility of further attacks, will make the provision of warnings, advice and information to the public particularly important and will require close cooperation between Suffolk's multi-agency coordination structures (SCG/TCG/FCP) and the Police command structure; this coordination will be achieved through the Police representatives at the various levels. The Chair of the Suffolk multi-agency SCG and TCG will be a senior Police Officer from Suffolk Constabulary and any terrorist incident that risks public safety would be declared a Major Incident by the Police.

Appropriate information would be shared between Police command structure and the SCG, including STAC for CBRN related incidents, to allow the development of a multi-agency strategy for response; multi-agency executives attending a SCG set up for a terrorist incident will be required to be vetted to NSV SC and NPPV 2 levels. A Police/Security Services/Military specific sub group to the SCG may be formed to allow more sensitive discussions to take place and to ensure operational response actions are effectively delivered. The Police will lead emergency services activity at the FCP, including the integration of any military support. The County Council will lead the Recovery Coordinating Group unless agreed differently with a District or

Borough Chief Executive or nominated executive representative at the 1st Recovery Coordinating Group meeting. MHCLG RED will lead a cross government GLT deployed to the SCC. They can provide advice and support to the SCG on consequence management issues and provide access to any ResCG that may have been established for a wide area incident. Specific arrangements for a terrorist response at Sizewell have been developed and can be found at Appendix L of the Sizewell Off Site Emergency Plan.

7. TELECOMMUNICATIONS

7.1. Airwave. The emergency services use a common communications system (AIRWAVE). This is a digital radio system with built-in encryption for security. Talk groups can be enabled locally, regionally or even nationally to allow responders to communicate with each other and their operations rooms. In addition to the emergency the military also use AIRWAVE to allow them to integrate into the emergency response communication network. Suffolk Constabulary holds 30 Interim Bronze Interoperability Solution (IBIS) sets for multiagency use.

The invocation and implementation of AIRWAVE interoperability are detailed in the SRF Telecommunications and ICT Plan.

7.2. Information Sharing During Emergencies. The Resilience Direct system is used to assist with the sharing of information during emergencies and to provide a common recognised picture of the incident. This secure system (up to OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE) is web based and can be accessed at SCG and TCG locations and at Emergency Control Centres/SILVER commands or by responding agencies/individuals with the appropriate RD access levels. Information on Resilience Direct is also available to neighbouring LRFs.

7.3. Alternative Communications. All Suffolk responders use fixed telephone and mobile phones to conduct day to day communications and this would continue during an emergency situation. To prevent systems from becoming unusable in emergencies due to high call loading, use is made of discrete telephone numbers (fixed telephones) and of the Mobile Telephone Privileged Access Telephone Scheme (MTPAS) for mobile phones. The latter system is a government-authorised scheme whereby the major mobile phone companies can prioritise calls on designated mobile numbers to improve connection between emergency responders.

7.4. Resilient Satellite Network (RSN). RSN is a high quality digital voice communications system. It provides a resilient and secure voice network and will play a critical role in enabling uninterrupted communication at Official-Sensitive level, between regional and national levels for incident management and coordination. Its main purpose is to allow the emergency services to remain in communication with central government and with each other until normal communications have been restored. RSN is located in the StratCC.

7.5. External Support. During a major incident, responding agencies in Suffolk can call upon the following external support:

- a. British Telecom (BT). BT can provide additional communications equipment and connectivity in an emergency (e.g. radio pagers, mobile phones, pay phone trailers at Rest Centres). This capability is available 24/7 through the National BT Control Room.
- b. RAYNET. RAYNET is a nationwide voluntary group of qualified radio amateurs who are able to provide emergency radio communications for the emergency services and local authorities. RAYNET can provide specialist VHF/UHF radio communications assistance across Suffolk. In addition to voice communications, RAYNET can offer data links and PMR repeaters, it now also possible to have Wi-Fi links, these services would require some pre-planning in

support of events and these services may have to be provided by groups outside of the Suffolk area.

7.6 Technical Advise. In the event of a wide area telecommunications disruption, technical advice to the SCG may be provided through the SRF Telecomms Sub Group.

8. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

8.1. Humanitarian Assistance (HA). HA can be defined as those activities aimed at addressing the needs of people affected by emergencies; the provision of psychological and social aftercare and the support in the short, medium and long term (Eyre 2007). During a major incident, the continued care of the public affected by the event is a primary objective of any response or recovery activity. This support is outlined as follows:

a. Immediate Assistance. In the first hour after an incident the emergency services will look after victims who fall in one of 4 categories:

(1) Uninjured. These people will have been involved in the incident, but will not necessarily want or require medical care; they will be removed from the hazard area to a **Survivor Reception Centre**. This centre is a secure area where people will be taken for short term shelter and first aid. As these people are potential witnesses, the Police will collate their details for the subsequent investigation and for Casualty Bureau use. The Survivor Reception Centre will only be activated for a short period of time and will then cease operation or may migrate into a **Rest Centre**. The longer term welfare requirements of communities affected by emergencies will be met through Humanitarian Assistance Centres.

(2) Injured. Injured people need to be rescued from the scene as quickly and safely as possible. The Ambulance and Fire and Rescue Services will work together to remove casualties from the scene. The Ambulance Service will initiate pre-hospital care and the transportation of patients to receiving hospitals. Names of injured people will be collected for the Casualty Bureau.

(3) Deceased. HM Coroner has the ultimate responsibility for identifying people who have died, the cause, and the time of death. The emergency services have procedures to provide evidential continuity of the handling of the deceased. If possible, bodies will be transferred to local hospital mortuary facilities. However, if a large number of deaths occur, bodies may be removed to a Victim Audit Area where they will be retained before transfer to an Emergency Mortuary. Suffolk has a dedicated Emergency Mortuary Plan, with arrangements for external support to provide increased body storage and emergency mortuary facilities. Further information on emergency mortuary arrangements can be found in the SRF Mass Fatalities Plan.

(4) Evacuees. Some emergencies may require the evacuation of large areas because of the danger to life from environmental or structural hazards. The evacuation will be coordinated by Suffolk Constabulary. Evacuated people will be directed to a **Rest Centre** within easy reach of the incident site. A Rest Centre, managed by the relevant Suffolk District/Borough authority, will provide temporary accommodation and welfare for evacuees and homeless survivors. The County Council may provide assistance with transportation of evacuees. Local authorities will record attendance at Rest Centres and will make arrangements for longer term housing of evacuees who have no alternative housing arrangements. Further information on evacuation can be found in SRF Evacuation and Shelter Guidance.

(5) Casualty Bureau. Suffolk Constabulary will provide a Casualty Bureau which is the initial point of contact for collating information relating to persons believed to be involved in an emergency. A telephone helpline number will be issued to the media to assist with enquires from relatives and friends. The Casualty Bureau will remain open until all the casualties have been identified, all the next of kin have been informed and telephone enquiries have diminished to a level that can be dealt with by the normal Police switchboard.

(6) Police Family Liaison Officers. After an incident that involves loss of life, Police Family Liaison Officers have a crucial role to play collating information that will assist in the identification process of victims by working with families and others. These officers have an important role to play in providing a single point of contact for families to keep them informed of any ongoing investigation. Social Care workers from Suffolk County Council often work in partnership with Police Family Liaison Officers to provide practical and emotional support.

b. Community Help Point & Longer Term Assistance. At the time of any emergency services response and in the immediate aftermath, local authorities may establish **Community Help Point(s)** (CHP) close to the incident scene. The role of the CHP is to help signpost people to Rest Centre, HAC, FFRC, SRC, or Volunteer Reception Centre (VRC) as necessary and be the initial point of contact for those affected by the events or who are having difficulty in finding more formal humanitarian support. Staff within the CHP will be highly visible and will work with any FCP established by the emergency services to support communities in the initial period after any incident.

In the longer term, local authorities will lead in the activation, establishment and administration of Humanitarian Assistance Centres with support from a range of agencies including voluntary organisations. This longer term facility will be sited to provide a one-stop shop for survivors, families and all those impacted by the emergency, through which they can access support, care and advice. The centre would be established as a multi-agency facility with the decision to activate being made by the SCG.

Representatives from faith groups may also be consulted or involved and interpreters may be arranged in to ensure the diverse needs of communities are met.

Network Rail would assist humanitarian support action following a rail incident.

8.2 Humanitarian Assistance Facilities. The following is detail on potential HA facilities that may be required in emergency response/ recovery phases:

Title	Purpose	Timescale/location/ Activation contact	Lead Organization/Plan
Casualty Bureau	Initial point of contact for receiving/assessing information about victims, to: Inform the investigation Trace and identify people	Immediate (if needed) Location: Police national arrangements.	Suffolk Constabulary. Use National Police Casualty Bureau arrangements.

Title	Purpose	Timescale/location/ Activation contact	Lead Organization/Plan
	Reconcile missing persons Collate accurate information for dissemination to appropriate parties.		
Survivor Reception Centre (SRC)	A secure area in which survivors not requiring acute hospital treatment can be taken for short-term shelter and first aid. Evidence may also be gathered here.	Immediate – duration short term. Location: Safe area, close the incident scene.	A SRC may be established and run initially by Suffolk Constabulary – those first on the scene - until the local authority becomes engaged in the response and assumes the lead role. SRC arrangements as per College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice.
Family & Friends Reception Centre (FFRC)	To help reunite family and friends with survivors – it will provide the capacity to register, interview and provide shelter for family and friends.	Within 12 hrs. Location: As agreed between Suffolk Constabulary & Suffolk County Council/Local Authority.	A FFRC would be established by Suffolk Constabulary in consultation with the Local Authority, and staffed by these organisations. Representatives of faith communities might be consulted and interpreters may be required. FFRC as per College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice.

Title	Purpose	Timescale/location/ Activation contact	Lead Organization/Plan
Rest Centre (RC)	A building designated or taken over by the Local Authority for temporary accommodation of evacuees/homeless survivors with overnight facilities.	Overnight – duration ideally up to a maximum of 48 hrs. Locations: Numerous pre-identified locations countywide.	Lead responsibility sits with the Local Authority, with contributions from Police, NHS bodies and the voluntary sector. Rest Centre arrangements included in Local Authority Joint Emergency Response Plan.
Humanitarian Assistance Centre (HAC)	Act as a focal point for information and assistance to those affected either directly or indirectly by the emergency. This could include: Survivors. Bereaved families and friends. Family and friends of those still missing. Wider Community.	Within 72hrs – duration may be weeks/months. Locations: 3 x Suffolk towns. Ipswich: IP City Town Hall. Bury St Edmunds: The Athenaeum. Lowestoft: TBC	Lead responsibility sits with Suffolk County Council as the Chair of the HAC Management Group will be a senior manager from Adult and Community Services. The operational plan for a Humanitarian Assistance Centre is included within the Local Authority Joint Emergency Response Plan
Volunteer Reception Centre (VRC)	Act as a focal point for the coordination, registration, skill identification and deployment of Spontaneous Volunteers (SV) & formed voluntary organisations.	Activated ASAP Location: an appropriate building close to the scene but outside the outer cordon.	Local authority assisted by SVOG member organisations & Community Emergency Groups.

8.3 Vulnerable People. Cabinet Office guidance, '[Identifying People Who Are Vulnerable in a Crisis](#)', defines vulnerable people as:

People that are less able to help themselves in the circumstances of an emergency

Suffolk response and recovery strategies for dealing with incidents take account of specific considerations posed by vulnerable people. However, all people have the potential to become vulnerable if they are removed from their established support mechanisms.

Many of the vulnerable groups or individuals will be known to existing service providers/statutory authorities (i.e. people who live or are present in vulnerable establishments such as nursing homes, day centres, residential care homes, very sheltered housing etc.). There will be others who, for a variety of reasons, are more difficult to identify – such as those individuals who live in the community, visitors to the area, or the homeless.

There is no central list of vulnerable people, instead information held by many different agencies will need to be brought together at the time of a specific incident, ideally by the TCG, or just prior if warning is available, to ensure that people can be supported during any emergency.

Identifying, planning for, and providing for the needs of these vulnerable groups will involve a number of partners sharing a large amount of complicated and changing information. Suffolk Resilience Forum has therefore developed specific guidance which assists in the identification of vulnerable groups and individuals. It provides a flexible process for collating and sharing information between Category 1 and 2 Responders whilst maintaining confidentiality and details additional support measures or actions to assist these groups or individuals during an incident. This protocol includes a 'list of lists'. This list provides:

- A list of organisations holding and maintaining vulnerable people data.
- Contact details for these organisations.
- Lists the type of vulnerability.
- Lists vulnerable establishments.

Contact numbers for organisations to request information on vulnerable groups and people are also contained in the SRF Alerting Directory, on RD.

Some information on vulnerable people and groups is also available GIS mapping systems owned by individual agencies; in due course some of this will be made available during emergencies via Resilience Direct mapping.

The SRF Vulnerable People guidance is available on RD and a redacted version is published on the SRF website

8.4 Psychosocial Care. During, and following, a major incident, individuals impacted may need a range of support and care services. In particular, those directly affected, their families, witnesses and the personnel of agencies involved in the response and recovery may need access to a range of psychosocial care interventions. This specialist area has responsibility for:

- Making arrangements for appropriate psychosocial support of everyone affected by a major incident.
- Coordinating the activities of agencies and organisations involved in this aspect.
- Coordination, appropriate training and supervision of agencies and organisations involved in psychosocial care.

Public advice for persons affected by a major incident is available on the SRF public website.

9. RECOVERY, INVESTIGATION AND STAND DOWN

9.1. Recovery. Recovery is the process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency. This is a multi-agency arrangement that starts at the same time as the response and continues with a handover of lead agency responsibility at SCG to the local authority. In Suffolk, where an incident occurs in a single district/borough area, the Chief Executive or nominated executive representative of the relevant district or borough council will chair the Recovery Coordinating Group meeting. If the incident crosses 2 or more district/borough areas, the County Council Chief Executive or a nominated executive representative will take the lead. A standalone [SRF Generic Recovery Plan](#) has been issued and is available on the SRF website and Resilience Direct.

9.2. Investigation. Every major incident may be the subject of an investigation whether for HM Coroner, a Police Inquiry, or civil or criminal court proceedings. These investigations will require evidence of the highest quality and this can only be achieved if the incident scene is secured as soon as possible and anything that can be reasonably anticipated to be required as evidence is preserved and not damaged. A number of different agencies may carry out their own investigation and attend the incident scene:

- Air Accident Investigation Branch
- Marine Accident Investigation Branch
- Rail Accident Investigation Branch
- Health & Safety Executive
- Office of the Rail and Road Regulator
- Office for Nuclear Regulation
- Environment Agency
- Fire Investigation

9.3. Funding for Response. All agencies responding to emergencies will be expected to fund initial response activities from within existing resources. Funding for subsequent response actions can be discussed at the SCG if appropriate. Agencies are advised to capture all costs related to emergency response. Information on recovering costs post emergency is contained in the SRF Generic Recovery Plan. **Funding should not be a constraint on providing emergency response, especially where life is at risk.**

9.4. Major Incident Stand Down. All agencies involved in the coordination of an emergency response should be consulted before a decision is made to stand down the response phase of an incident. This may not be possible until public confidence has been restored to the affected areas. The decision to stand down a formal emergency response and to hand over ongoing activity to either a formal recovery structure or to normal business will be taken at the strategic level.

9.5. Debriefing. When the incident has concluded, a formal system of debriefing will take place. This starts within each agency involved and seeks to identify what went well and what could be improved. These individual agency lessons will, if necessary, be incorporated into agency's operational procedures and plans. A wider SRF structured process will follow to identify any multi-agency lessons. These

lessons will be captured on a standardised spreadsheet, published on the SRF Resilience Direct site and regularly monitored for implementation. Further, upward reporting may be required to support national learning or to progress areas of weakness that cannot be resolved at a local level.

10. MUTUAL AID & OTHER ASSISTANCE

10.1 Mutual Aid. Experience has shown that major incidents are often of a scale that exceeds county based resources. In these cases, mutual aid arrangements are important as they provide a standing framework for additional resources to be quickly deployed. The following mutual aid arrangements are in place:

- a. Central Government. MHCLG RED will assist counties in requests for/offer of mutual aid and central government support.
- b. Police. Regional agreements exist with regard to specific areas of Police work. National Police Co-ordination Centre (NPCC) based in London, co-ordinate resources across the country as required. Police National Mobilisation Plan (PNMP) requires each Constabulary to have an outline plan on how they will deal with an influx of officers from other areas e.g. accommodation, catering, administration, briefing, etc.
- c. Fire. National Coordination Advisory Framework (NCAF) is a national protocol which exists for every Fire and Rescue Authority (FRA) to provide mutual aid assistance to any FRA in the UK in the event of a serious incident. A serious incident is one that would overwhelm the resources of one authority or geographical area and/or require specialist national assets which are not provided in the host Fire and Rescue Service area. In the event of a request being made to an assisting authority, the Chief Officer of the assisting authority will make every endeavour to provide the resources requested. The request will either be made directly to the assisting authority or via the National Resilience Fire Control (NRFC). The role of the NRFC is to act as a coordination point to mobilise resources and maintain a national overview of UKFRS assets available during the incident. On a regional basis a working agreement exists to provide cross border assistance and enable a FRA to discharge the function of another authority in line with the parameters of section 13 and 16 of the Fire and Rescue Service Act 2004.
- d. Ambulance. The National Ambulance Coordination Centre coordinates requests for extra resources as a national response to the requesting service. This facilitates the minimum of interruption to the normal response of supporting ambulance services.
- e. NHS. The NHS in Suffolk has provision for mutual aid through the NHS England, East Anglia Mutual Aid Agreement. This agreement provides a framework in which to:
 - Request mutual aid in support of a Major Incident or Major Incident Standby.
 - Ensure upward reporting of a request for mutual aid.
 - Arrange assets in response to a request.
 - Manage the reception of mutual aid.
 - Organise the return of mutual aid.

f. Local Authorities. The Suffolk Joint Emergency Planning Partnership dated 1 April 2010⁶ includes a MoU detailing mutual aid arrangements between all Suffolk local authorities in the following areas:

- Crisis management support (lead local authority).
- Standardisation of emergency planning.
- Training and exercising.
- Provision of rest centres.

The MoU allows for councils to request and to provide support in relation to incidents within Suffolk.

g. UK Armed Forces. The Armed Forces contribute to UK resilience through providing specialist capabilities (such as explosive ordnance disposal) and by assisting civil authorities and structures when the need exceeds civil capability or capacity. They do this in response to specific requests for a planned response or to a crisis. The Suffolk Resilience Forum (SRF) will always engage early with UK Armed Forces during any incident through the JRLO East and will invite early involvement in any strategic coordination process.

7th Infantry Brigade & HQ East is the Army Regional Point of Command (RPOC) Brigade Headquarters for the East of England and East Midlands. JRLO East is the primary focus for integrating military UK operations with civil authorities in the East of England. He routinely attends the SRF Executive Group and would represent Defence at the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG). He is supported by Military Liaison Officers (MLOs) who could deploy to other SCGs, in the event of a multi-county incident, or the Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG) to support the co-ordination of MACA at the Tactical level.

The HQ Air Command – RAF Regional Liaison Officer East of England (RAFRLO EE) is the point of contact for RAF-specific MACA, military aircraft post-crash management and related issues. He would provide RAF-specific advice and assistance at SCG and/ or TCG as required.

Contact with either Regional Liaison Officer can range from informal requests for information or advice to formal requests for MACA; the latter should be made as early as possible. Contact details for JRLO East, HQ 7th Infantry Brigade & HQ East Duty Officer and RAFRLO EE are in the SRF alerting Directory.

The provision of military assistance is governed by 4 principles. MACA may be authorised when:

1. There is a definite need to act and the tasks the armed forces are being asked to perform are clear.
2. Other options, including mutual aid and commercial alternatives, have been discounted; and either

⁶ [JEPU Legal Agreement](#)

3. The civil authority lacks the necessary capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one; or
4. The civil authority has all or some capability, but it may not be available immediately, or to the required scale, and the urgency of the task requires rapid external support from MOD.

Notwithstanding the above, under exceptional circumstances, agreed usually at ministerial level, it may be necessary to waive temporarily the above criteria. This may include major events of national and international importance, or for an event that is catastrophic in nature.

As there are no standing military forces for these tasks, military support is not guaranteed. When military support is provided the civil authorities normally have to pay for it, in line with HM Treasury rules. Treasury rules dictate that Government Departments charge for services that are not part of their funded tasks. Defence will charge full costs except where there is imminent danger to life when charges are waived, and in prescribed circumstances when marginal costs will be applied.

The provision of MACA requires approval by a Defence Minister following a request by a government department. If MACA is urgently needed to alleviate distress and preserve and safeguard lives and property in time of disaster, local military commanders may be contacted directly for assistance. JRLO East should be informed of such requests as soon as possible after contact is made.

Requests for MACA should normally be generated in conjunction with the JRLO East and, where necessary, the RAFRLO EE. The request should describe the effect required, the general situation (especially if it is part of a criminal investigation), the capability gap (including efforts to address the requirement through mutual aid or commercial contractors), and where and for how long MACA is required.

The armed forces can be brought in to deal with a range of situations including, but not limited to:

- natural disasters, helping people in severe weather situations, such as flooding, where there is a need to protect human life, property and alleviate distress
- network failure or disruption; animal disease outbreaks or public health epidemics; and public service related industrial disputes that affect our safety or security, or disrupt transport or communications links
- criminal or terrorist activity, providing specialist expertise in specific circumstances
- after a terrorist attack where armed military personnel may be deployed to locations usually guarded by armed police officers, to enable those officers to undertake other duties
- bomb disposal: known officially as 'explosive ordnance disposal'; this can be related to terrorism, or involve unearthing a bomb from the Second World War
- mountain rescue, involving the Royal Air Force Mountain Rescue Service, to support the civil authorities by helping people in danger

- UK waters: protecting our territorial waters, ports, ships and energy installations from terrorist attack, protecting fisheries, preventing drug or people smuggling
- UK airspace: detecting and deterring aircraft approaching UK sovereign airspace and protecting UK and NATO monitored airspace

When considering military assistance, it is important to bear in mind the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the Armed Forces:

- Armed Forces personnel are few compared to the number of staff in the emergency services, health service and local authorities.
- The skills, equipment, and capabilities of the Armed Forces are designed for military use, mainly for expeditionary operations.
- The Armed Forces draw on civil capabilities wherever necessary.
- The Armed Forces are not designed to provide an emergency response service, with certain exceptions.
- The Armed Forces do not have a monopoly on equipment suitable for use in emergencies.

Further information can be found at:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2015-to-2020-government-policy-military-aid-to-the-civil-authorities-for-activities-in-the-uk>

h. US Military. USAF support from RAF Mildenhall or Lakenheath may be requested by SRF to provide Military Aid to aid the civil response to an incident. United States of America Department of Defense Directive 5100.46 dated 6 July 2012 details the US policy for the provision of Foreign Disaster Relief by United States Visiting Forces (USVF). A request for USVF support initiated at the SCG would be passed through the HQ USAFE-UK SCG representative, or in their absence the JRLO East or the RAFRLO-EE, to the Commander of either 100 Air Refuelling Wing or 48 Fighter Wing. Where prompt action is required to save human lives, the Commander of the relevant Wing may authorise immediate aid in the absence of formal authorisation from the US Chief of Mission; this excludes assistance that does not contribute to urgent life-saving efforts. In all other cases the request will be referred to the US Embassy and onward to the US Department of Defense. The UK MOD will be informed of the request by the JRLO East or RAFRLO-EE. The decision on provision of USVF military aid will then lie with UK and US Governments.

i. Combined Tactical Air Cell (CTAC). A CTAC can be requested, usually by Police, for enduring major incidents involving three or more aircraft from two or more agencies. If a CTAC is formed an Aviation Tactical Advisor will be deployed to the TCG.

j. Search and Rescue. Search and Rescue helicopter provision is the responsibility of the Coastguard. The MCA Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre (ARCC), based at Fareham, will be operationally independent from the Coastguard's maritime and coastal operations, working to the Aviation Branch. Emergency Services will receive a service that provides SAR aviation assets to the

most appropriate requests based on the need only and according to prevailing conditions.

10.2. Strategic Holding Areas. Suffolk has 2 pre-identified Strategic Holding Areas to allow mutual aid resources from outside of the county to be mustered prior to deployment and supported once deployed. Further detail is available via the SRF Resilience Direct site.

MoD will not guarantee the availability of Defence facilities during civil emergency, and will not undertake to provide more than hard-standing space. First point of contact is the JRLO East at HQ 7th Infantry Brigade and HQ East.

10.3. Voluntary Organisations. The numerous voluntary organisations, nationally, regionally and in Suffolk, have the potential to provide additional capacity and specialist capability for any incident response or during the recovery phase. A dedicated Suffolk Voluntary Organisations Group (SVOG) is part of the SRF framework. An electronic directory (available on Resilience Direct) has been produced by the SRF to highlight each organisation's capabilities and how they can be contacted in times of crisis. SRF plans acknowledge the support that voluntary organisations provide but will not rely upon this support to deliver a core response unless this has been formally agreed. There are formal agreements between some Category 1 & 2 responders and SVOG members. The capacity/coordination of voluntary organisations during large scale, widespread incident, should be an SRF consideration.

10.4. Community Emergency Groups. As part of the national community resilience programme, Suffolk local authorities operate a Community Emergency Group system across the county. These groups are routinely supported by the Suffolk JEPUs and where available are able to offer support to the emergency response by acting as a conduit for information and in some cases providing practical support for people who might be affected by the incident (e.g. community rest centres). Community Emergency Groups are triggered and subsequently managed through the JEPUs or relevant district/borough council Emergency Control Centre, when activated. Further detail on Suffolk Community Emergency Groups can be found at: <https://www.suffolkresilience.com/prepare-your-community>.

10.5. Spontaneous (Convergent) Volunteers (SV).

A spontaneous volunteer is defined as *an 'individual who is unaffiliated with official response organisation [organised voluntary sector organisations are recognised as part of the official response], yet without extensive pre-planning, is motivated to provide unpaid support to the response and/or recovery to an emergency'*.

If spontaneous volunteers are not properly managed they can divert resources and attention away from response and recovery activities. Spontaneous volunteers who are not involved in the official response activities, may also engage in providing emergency help away from the official response, potentially placing themselves and those they aim to help in danger.

At the earliest opportunity during the response to an emergency, a senior local authority officer should assess the situation around the incident scene to determine the scale of spontaneous support; this assessment should include discussions with

any pre-existing community groups. This assessment and consultation may subsequently lead to the tasking of the organised voluntary sector with a view to the engaging of spontaneous volunteers as required to support humanitarian assistance response.

If the situation dictates, and it is appropriate for the 'employment' of spontaneous volunteers, the establishment of a Volunteer Reception Centre (VRC) facility should be considered for the administration/management of the volunteers. A Spontaneous Volunteer Coordinator should be appointed and dependant on local authority resources, consideration should be given to approaching organised voluntary sector organisations or an established Community Emergency Group, to assist in staffing/management of the VRC. Operational communications links should be created between the local authority ECC/s and the Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG) Voluntary and Community Sector Coordinator (VCS Coord).

All agencies at the incident scene should be made aware of the establishment of a VRC in order to direct potential SVs away from the immediate incident scene. An appropriate public communication message should be prepared for media/social media broadcast indicating the SV approach/requirement.

11. TRAINING AND EXERCISE


11.1. The SRF Training & Exercise Protocol provides the mechanism, process, timescales and documentation that are used to develop exercises. The SRF aims to exercise contingency arrangements for VERY HIGH or HIGH risks every 3 years; called SUFFEX.

11.2. In addition, statutory demonstrations of emergency arrangements for Sizewell and Upper Tier COMAH sites will be conducted in line with REPPIR and COMAH regulations. Exercises to test arrangements for other risks will be held as follows:


- When plans/procedures are first established.
- After a major review post incident.
- After a major review post exercise.
- To reinforce any training that has been delivered.

11.3. Prior to any SRF exercise, further training of responders may take place either by individual agencies, to ensure people can conduct the required response role, or through multi-agency training, to ensure that people from multiple organisations, are able to operate collectively.

APPENDIX A -EXPANDED SUFFOLK MULTI-AGENCY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COMMAND, CONTROL & COORDINATION DIAGRAM



APPENDIX B -OVERVIEW OF SUFFOLK CRISIS MANAGEMENT LOCATIONS



APPENDIX C - STRATEGIC COORDINATING GROUP

1. Generic Strategy. A Suffolk SCG will start with the following generic objectives to formulate a multi-agency strategy; this will be set at the first meeting to focus on the particular hazard and be reviewed at subsequent meetings:

- Saving and protecting human life
- Containing the scale and nature of the incident
- Relieving suffering
- Maintaining critical services
- As far as is reasonably practicable, protecting property
- Providing the public with clear, accurate and timely information relevant to public health and safety
- Providing adequate health and safety for responding personnel
- Maintaining public order and the rule of law
- Safeguarding the environment
- Facilitating investigations and inquiries
- Promoting self-help and recovery
- Facilitating a return to business as usual as soon as reasonably practicable
- Evaluating the incident and response
- Identifying lessons to be learnt and action same

2. Agenda. The meeting agenda will cover standard items and will be added to according to incident need:

Strategic Coordination Group Standard Agenda

PLEASE NOTE WHERE POSSIBLE MEETINGS SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO A MAXIMUM OF 20 MINUTES

If you are Teleconferencing into the meeting please dial in 5 minutes before the meeting is due to commence – after which time the facility will be locked

It is recommended that wherever possible abbreviations, acronyms and terminology are NOT used within the Strategic Coordination Centre environment.

WHICH REPRESENTATIVES NEED TO BE AT THIS MEETING? – CHECK ATTENDANCE

First Meeting - Battle Rhythm

REFER TO RELEVANT CONTINGENCY PLANS

Vetting Issues (if needed)

1. Current position re incident and prognosis
2. Urgent Actions
3. **Adjourn as Necessary to Action Urgent Issues (no more than 5 mins to brief staff)**
4. Update from Agencies/Cells/Media
Update/Advice re possible countermeasures
Position re hazards presented
Update on casualties
Recovery
5. Set/Review Strategy/Objectives and priorities (refer **Appendix PT2 - G**)
Include Strategy for Information Cell
6. Review progress on actions from last meeting
7. Confirm and allocate new actions
Items for Situational Reports (**Appendix PT 2 – H**)
8. Activate Recovery Coordinating Group
9. Any other business
10. Time of next meeting

Cells/Issues that may be required

Science and
Technical Advice Cell

Media Coordination

Casualty Bureau

Tactical Coordination

Other Considerations

Is Legal Advice
required?

Humanitarian
Assistance?

Psychosocial
Support?

Advice to the Public?

Suffolk Helpline?

Handover for
recovery?


Response Stand
down?

All agencies are reminded to pass any required documentation to colleagues in the event of a handover/shift change and to retain any paperwork/policy logs connected to the incident for potential evidential purposes.

3. Generation. When the StratCC is activated as part of a Major Incident response, SCG meetings will be arranged in accordance with the StratCC Guide. SCG teleconferences can be called by any single Category 1 responder by informing the JEPU Duty officer. The default location for physical meetings is the Strategic Coordination Centre, Police HQ, Martlesham Heath. If face to face meetings are not required, teleconferencing can be arranged through the Suffolk JEPU.

4. Battle Rhythm. The SCG battle rhythm is set to allow interaction with national crisis management structures, i.e. COBR or Lead Government Department Incident Room, and to allow time for tactical coordination activity to deliver operational effect. The SCG⁷ battle rhythm is visualized below:

SCG



⁷ The SCG Rolling Update is a short, max 3 mins, update of key facts by the SCG Chair in the multi-agency room of the StratCC

APPENDIX D - STRATEGIC CO ORDINATION GROUP - STANDARD SITREP FORMAT

1. Below is a paper version of a national SITREP format that is now completed electronically via Resilience Direct, it gives the information that is required to be completed online using the Agency Reports.

The SITREP is completed at the start of any incident involving a SCG and subsequently thereafter as follows:

- 30 mins before any SCG meeting to provide situational awareness to inform decision making.
- After any SCG meeting with updates received during discussions.
- On request from COBR via Government Liaison Team

The SITREP will be used to brief at the start of each SCG meeting to reduce the need for 'round robin' updates. The SITREP is available on the SRF Resilience Direct site to all Suffolk Category 1 and 2 responders involved in the incident and to any central government crisis management structures (e.g. COBR or Lead Government Department Incident Room). In the event that a SCG is held by teleconferencing, the minutes will be considered as the SITREP.

2. Single agency input should be completed using the Agency Report template on Resilience Direct using guidance given below on what should be included.

The first sections of the report will be completed by the StratCC Coordinator.

SUFFOLK STRATEGIC COORDINATING GROUP (SCG) SITUATION REPORT

EVENT/INCIDENT			
DATE & TIME			
SCG CHAIR	<i>(name and contact details)</i>		
SITREP POINT OF CONTACT	<i>(name and contact details for amendments / collation)</i>	SITREP No.	

SUMMARY OF GUIDANCE FOR COMPLETION OF THE TEMPLATE (REMOVE WHEN COMPLETE)

Annex Two contains detailed guidance notes, but please observe the following key points in completing the SITREP template:

This SITREP will focus on the strategic dimensions of the emergency and issues arising from that. It will be based on operational reporting, but the strategic issues should not be obscured by operational detail.

The template is intended for use in civil emergencies and CT incidents alike.

The RAG status will reflect a judgement of the situation, progress and likely developments – there is no detailed method or metrics to follow, just a defensible judgement of these three dimensions.

Reporting the assessed quality of information, together with source and time is critical.

Where images (e.g. maps) and tables (e.g. progress against key indicators) support situational awareness they will usually be appended in annexes.

SITUATION OVERVIEW

A concise and strategic overview of the situation, its impacts and implications. This should be written as paragraph of text or using a few bullet points, and will draw on the operational (METHANE – see annex one) reporting, but emphasise the strategic dimensions and issues.

SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE

A concise overview of the operational response, drawing attention to any current or foreseen resource or capability issues. This should also summarise the Command, Control and Coordination (C3) arrangements that have been established.

FORWARD LOOK

A summary of possible developments, emerging risks and critical uncertainties that have potential strategic implications for the response and recovery effort.

RESOURCE ISSUES

A summary of current and foreseeable resource and capability issues, highlighting any potential or possible requirements for assistance, for example mutual aid between responders or through MACA.

STRATEGY

Working strategy	<i>A course of action integrating ends, ways and means to meet policy objectives.</i>
Overarching aim	<i>A short, precise and measurable statement of the overall end state you want to achieve. Influenced by, and consistent with, overarching policy.</i>
Objectives	<i>A list of steps, phases or tasks that have to be completed in order to achieve the overarching, strategic aim.</i>
Public comms strategy	<i>A statement of intent and brief description of the course of action to inform and communicate with the public.</i>

AGENCY SITUATION REPORTS TO INCLUDE SUMMARIES OF:

Direct and wider impacts
 The operational response
 Significant risks, emerging issues
 Assumptions and critical uncertainties
 Forward look
 Other resilience issues arising
 RAG status explanation
 Point of contact and time/date of last update/check of the information

Emergency Services	RAG Status	
Police	R A G	
Fire	R A G	
Ambulance	R A G	
Maritime & Coastguard Agency	R A G	
Other	R A G	

Local Authority(ies)	RAG Status	
Local Authority NAME Department NAME	R A G	
Local Authority NAME Department NAME	R A G	

Health	RAG Status	
NHS England	R A G	
Public Health England	R A G	

Met Office	RAG Status	
Current situation	R A G	
Forecast	R A G	
Likely impacts and risks arising	R A G	

Environment Agency	RAG Status	Note: For pluvial and groundwater flooding the Lead Local Flood Authority (LLFA) will also be involved and reporting
Current situation	R A G	
Forecast	R A G	
Likely impacts and risks arising	R A G	

Animal & Plant Health Agency	RAG Status	
Current situation	R A G	
Forecast	R A G	
Likely impacts and risks arising	R A G	

Transport	RAG Status	
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Highways England	R A G	
Highways Authority (see LA)	R A G	
Network Rail	R A G	
British Transport Police	R A G	
Train Operating Company	R A G	
Other	R A G	

Utilities	RAG Status	
Electricity	R A G	
Gas	R A G	
Water	R A G	
Telecoms	R A G	
Other	R A G	

Voluntary Sector	RAG Status	
Organisation NAME	R A G	
Organisation NAME	R A G	

Military	RAG Status	
Overview	R A G	
By unit or by capability area	R A G	Capability areas would for example include logistic support, EOD (explosives), engineering or air support.

Summary of other involved groups	RAG Status	
STAC	R A G	
Humanitarian Assistance	R A G	
Recovery Coordination Group	R A G	
Other	R A G	

Other Responders	RAG Status	Note when other org's are involved, their input will usually be included in the report of their 'sponsoring organisation'
Organisation NAME	R A G	
Organisation NAME	R A G	

ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE SITUATION, RESPONSE EFFORTS AND PROGRESS

This should reflect the perception, established from a range of sources including social media, of different public and community groups, including residents, businesses and those who are indirectly as well directly affected by events.

PUBLIC AND COMMUNITY RESPONSE


This should cover:

Key messages being issued, in line with the public communications strategy;
 Means being employed to **send** key messages to public and community groups;
 Means being employed to **receive** communications from public and community groups.

OTHER ISSUES NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE


**DATE AND TIME OF
NEXT SITREP UPDATE**

APPENDIX E - LIKELY FORM OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT BASED ON THE ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL IMPACT AND GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD OF AN EMERGENCY



APPENDIX F - JOINT EMERGENCY SERVICES INTEROPERABILITY

1. Fit with Civil Emergency Arrangements. The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme has developed “JESIP Joint Doctrine, the interoperability framework” which is the bedrock of the whole programme. It provides commanders, at the scene and elsewhere, with generic guidance on what actions they should undertake when responding to major and complex incidents and the principles are equally relevant to day to day joint operations.



2. Joint Doctrine Basics.



3. Use By Responders. While JESIP is focussed on improving how the police, fire and ambulance services work together at the scene of a major or complex incident, emergency response is a multi-agency activity and will usually involve collective working with variety of other responder organisations.

4. Joint Decision Making Model. A Joint Decision Model has been produced to help emergency services commanders gather and share available information, reconcile objectives and then make effective decisions together to produce and agree a multi-agency response plan with clear prioritised objectives. This concept can be applied across other agencies although may not be face to face in all circumstances.



5. Further Information. Further information on JESIP, including aide memoires and training packages, can be found on the JESIP website: <http://www.jesip.org.uk/>

APPENDIX G - GLOSSARY

Abbreviation	Description
ABP	Associated British Ports
APHA	Animal Health and Plant Agency (executive agency of DEFRA)
BEIS	Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
BCM	Business Continuity Management
BRONZE	Operational level of crisis management
BT	British Telecom
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CCA	Civil Contingencies Act 2004
CCR	Suffolk Police Contact and Control Room (ex Force Operations Room)
CFIL	Council for Food Intervention Levels
CFOA	Chief Fire Officers Association
CFRA	Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Room
Coordination	Integration of individual agency activity in order to achieve mutually agreed collective objectives.
Command	Authority that is associated with a role or rank within an organisation to give direction to other people working within the same organisation. Command cannot be exercised by one organisation over another.
COMAH	Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations
Control	Application of authority and the capability to manage organisation's resources to deliver defined objectives. Control may be delegated to another organisation for specified time period to attain defined objectives.
CRCE	Centre for Radiation, Chemicals and the Environment
CRIP	Common Recognised Information Picture
CRR	Community Risk Register
CT	Counter Terrorism
MHCLG	Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government
DEFRA	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DHSC	Department of Health and Social Care
DNEO	Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation
EA	Environment Agency (executive agency of DEFRA)
EEAST	East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust
EPDO	Emergency Planning Duty Officer (JEPU)
FCP	Forward Command Post
FFRC	Friends and Family Reception Centre
FRSNCC	Fire and Rescue Service National Co-ordination Centre
GLT	Government Liaison Team
GOLD	Strategic level of decision making (Individual Agency)
FOB	Forward Operating Base (APHA Control Centre)
HAC	Humanitarian Assistance Centre
HART	Ambulance – Hazardous Area Response Team
JEPU	Joint Emergency Planning Unit (Suffolk local authorities)
JESIP	Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme

Abbreviation	Description
JRLO	Joint Regional Liaison Officer
LGA	Local Government Association
LGD	Lead Government Department
LRF	Local Resilience Forum (generic term)
MACA	Military Aid to Civil Authorities
MCA	Maritime & Coastguard Agency
MCC	Media Communications Cell
MERIT	Medical Emergency Response Incident Team
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MTPAS	Mobile Telephone Priority Access Telephone Scheme
NDCC	National Disease Control Centre
NMOC	National Maritime Operations Centre
NPCC	National Police Chiefs' Council (previously ACPO - Association of Chief Police Officers)
ONR	Office for Nuclear Regulation
PHE	Public Health England
MAHP	Major Accident Hazard Pipeline Regulations
RAFRLO-EE	RAF Regional Liaison Officer East of England
Raynet	Radio Amateurs Network
RC	Rest Centre
RCG	Recovery Coordinating Group
RD	Resilience Direct (web based information sharing platform)
RED	Resilience & Emergencies Division
REPPiR	Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations
ResCG	Response Coordinating Group
RMU	Radiation Monitoring Unit
RSN	Resilience Satellite Network
SCG	Strategic Coordinating Group
SILVER	Tactical (coordination) level of crisis management (Individual Agency)
SITREP	Situation Report
SORT	Special Operations Response Team
SRC	Survivor Reception Centre
SRF	Suffolk Resilience Forum
STAC	Science and Technical Advice Cell
StratCC	Strategic Coordination Centre (located at Suffolk Constabulary HQ)
TCG	Tactical Coordinating Group
USAFE-UK	United States Airforce Europe – UK
USVF	US Visiting Forces
VRC	Volunteer Reception Centre
WoW	Working on Wednesday (fortnightly working level SRF mechanism)